讲座题目

Hobbesian wars and institutional safeguards

主讲人

谢阳 University of California, Riverside

会议信息

时间：2023年4月18日（周二）12:30-13:30

地点：vic67维多利亚3308明德主楼405会议室

嘉宾简介

Yang Xie is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of California, Riverside. He is also affiliated with the 21st Century China Center at the University of California, San Diego, as a Non-resident Scholar. His research interests include political and comparative economics and environmental and resource economics.

报告摘要

This paper formalizes the principle that persecution power of government may generate violent contests over it. We show that this principle yields a large set of theoretical insights on different separation-of-powers institutions that can help to preempt such contests under different socio-economic conditions. When socio-economic cohesion is low, the risk of contests can be eliminated only by individual veto against persecution. Moreover, such unanimity rule is resilient to autocratic shocks only when the chief executive does not control the legislative agenda, i.e., the executive and legislative branches are separate. When socio-economic cohesion is high, the risk of violent contests can be eliminated without individual veto, but only by a persecution-reviewing judiciary whose members cannot join the executive branch in the future, i.e., when the executive and judicial branches are separate. Our results shed light on the evolution of separation of powers in European history.

图文/供稿：和平与发展经济学研究所

设计 责编：孟小琪 马文林

审核：谢伦裕 宋枫